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Rituals of Sport
The Ritual
Humans are unusual creatures. Unlike most other animals and even the higher 
mammals, human interact with each other on the basis of shared understanding. In 
social life, the way an act is communally understood determines what it actually is. The 
intentions which are imputed to an act on the basis of the shared meanings of a group 
define what that act is and, crucially, what its real effects on the social group will be. 
As John Searle has recently put it: ‘for social facts, the attitude we take toward the 
phenomenon is partly constitutive of the phenomena’ (Searle 1995: 34). Searle notes 
that because they are constituted by the definitions which are put on them, social facts 
have ‘no analogue among physical facts’ (Searle 1995: 34) and this also leads to a 
further important feature of social facts. They ‘can be created by explicit performative 
utterances’ (Searle 1995: 34). Thus, the phrase ‘I appoint you chairman’ so long as it is 
understood by those to whom it is directed has a determinate effect in the social world. 
A definition induces certain social actions and, thereby, creates a social reality in and of 
itself. In his famous tract for a Wittgensteinian and hermeneutic social science, Peter 
Winch (1977) gave the example of a cyclist, the raising of whose hand was taken to 
mean that he was turning right. The signal was a physical act but it became socially 
efficacious, instructing following motorists to slow down, because the motorists and the 
cyclist understood what raising a hand meant in this context. The meaningfulness of 
social life does not in any way imply that social life is reducible to merely individual 
interpretations. Reality is not what any particular individual takes it to be but it does 
consist of what the group members together agree it to be. Social relations only are 
what they are in virtue of what the humans engaged in them mutually take them to be. 
Shared understanding are critical feature of human social interaction. 
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If humans interact with each other and perform social practices on the basis of 
shared understandings which describe the significance of these acts, then humans must 
publicly agree upon these understandings. Shared understandings – which define what 
any act in fact is - are not wired into human biology; they are not instinctive. They have 
to be learnt and re-learnt. Consequently, the members of each social group have to 
confirm their mutual understanding of their practices with other members of the group. 
Group members have to check continually that the understandings they have of their 
practices are shared by others. If understandings are not compatible, then group 
members will act in ways which will be incomprehensible to others and will cause the 
dissolution of the group. Social relations persist only so long as those engaged in them 
act towards each other on the basis of recognised understandings, even if those 
understandings are often taken for granted by the parties. Although he is constantly 
disparaged for his putative objectivism, Durkheim provided one of the most compelling 
accounts of the way in which social groups re-constitute themselves by re-affirming 
their shared understandings of themselves. Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life is a profound sociological account of ritual which, nearly a century after 
its publication, still provides one of the most fruitful resources for comprehending these 
social events. In that work, Durkheim argued that the ritual sustains the social solidarity 
of aboriginal clans in Australia and indeed the solidarity of all social groups. For most 
of the year, aboriginal clans were engaged in the profane activity of hunting and 
gathering during which time they would fissure into smaller groups but, periodically, 
the clan would gather together and engage in ecstatic rituals in which they would 
worship their totemic god. Durkheim appositely noted that since the totem which the 
clanspeople worshipped represented their own social group, whose reality they felt 
viscerally in these ecstatic ritualistic moments when the clan was physically 
congregated, aborigines, in fact, worshipped their own social group, the clan, in their 
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rituals. The physical sensations which aborigines experienced in the ritual and which 
they attributed to their god was, in fact, the power of their social group which was 
amassed ecstatically around them. Indeed, they did more than simply worship this 
social god. Through their participation in these heightened moments of collective 
effervescence, the clanspeople recreated this god, their society, for themselves. Only 
insofar as the clan gathered together periodically, reaffirming its existence which was 
represented by the totem, did this social group exist at all. Without these periodic 
congregations in which the individuals who are members of a social group mutually 
recognise themselves as a group and enact group membership, social groups cannot 
continue to exist.
A society can neither create itself nor recreate itself without at the same time 
creating an ideal. This creation is not a sort of work of supererogation for it, by 
which it would complete itself, being already formed; it is the act by which it is 
periodically made and remade. (Durkheim 1954:422)
For Durkheim, the ritual inculcates a certain idea of society into the minds of its 
members, which idea is essential to that social group. The group exists only if 
individuals recognise this idea of society and act in ways which this shared 
understanding enjoins. However, this ideal does not impose itself upon individuals 
automatically or inevitably, as Durkheim seemed to suggest in much of his early work, 
in which society was given autonomous existence. Rather, this ideal has to be recreated 
by the individuals. The ritual constitutes the key site for this recreation. As Durkheim 
emphasises, this ritualistic recreation is not otiose. It is essential that individuals gather 
together and celebrate their membership of a unified social group if that group is to 
exist. The implication is clear. Without periodic ritual interaction, a social group 




Since human social relations are distinctively constituted by the very definitions which 
those people involved in them put upon them, ritual is an essential and universal 
element of human social life. In his recent work on ritual, Rappaport (2000) analysed 
the role of the specifically religious ritual in human evolution, arguing in Durkheimian 
fashion, that the ritual constitutes the central point of human social life, explaining the 
adaptive flexibility of human social groups. For Rappaport, as for Durkheim, social 
relations are ‘indexically’ demonstrated in the ritual. The participation in the ritual 
demonstrates in and of itself the social relation between to people. By this, he means 
that mere participation in a ritual commits group members to each other. 
For instance, if one Maring casually said to another whom he happened to be 
visiting,  ‘I’ll help you when next you go to war’ it would not be clear whether 
this was to be taken as a vague statement of intent, as a prediction of what he 
would be likely to do, or as a promise, nor would it necessarily be clear what 
might be meant by help. To dance this message in a ritual, however, makes it 
clear to all concerned that a pledge to help is undertaken and it is conventionally 
understood that that help entails fighting. Ritual, this is to say, not only ensures 
the correctness of performative enactment, but also makes the performatives it 
carries explicit. (Rappaport 2000:116)
Ritual indicates commitment to the group. However, in his opening definitions of the 
ritual, he excludes ‘games’ as a proper form of ritual because their outcomes are 
uncertain and they thus fail his formality criterion, where the ritual elements are known 
and unchanging. In addition, since ‘games’ involve winners and losers, they do not 
unify social groups which, according to Rappaport, is one of the other key defining 
functions of the ritual. The central reason for Rappaport’s desire to exclude the sporting 
ritual from his analysis of ritual per se is that he probably rightly believes that the 
specifically religious ritual was fundamental to the course of human evolution and he is 
interested in how this ritual form influenced the adaptation of human society. Thus, it is 
entirely valid that, for his argument, he should exclude the sporting ritual from 
consideration. However, that internal validity does not mean that his objections to the 
status of games as rituals are in themselves valid. Although religious rituals certainly 
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aim at unifying the church that celebrates communally in them, the unity of the church 
in no way implies equality. On the contrary, most religious rituals consciously vindicate 
social and gender hierarchies and, indeed, celebrate them. The division of winner and 
loser in sporting rituals is simply another way by which social hierarchy is 
demonstrated, vindicated and celebrated. Moreover, although a hierarchy is established 
between the teams in the sporting ritual, both teams are unified by their understanding 
of what competition involves and the virtues that constitute a winner. Rappaport’s claim 
that the uncertainty of the sporting ritual also denies its status as a true ritual is 
problematic. There are many rituals with religious dimensions, which Rappaport 
himself cites as proper rituals, such as potlatch or Big Man ceremonies, where the 
outcome is not certain; it is unclear who will establish themselves as the Big Man 
before the sacrifices have taken place. Moreover, the uncertainty of the sporting ritual is 
exaggerated. It is true that the winner is not known (and this uncertainty induces 
excitement in the participants) but that there will be a winner and a loser is a certainty 
and the criterion of winning and losing is always formally known beforehand. Sport is a 
form of ritual and as such it is part of that aspect of human existence – the religious 
ritual more generally – which Rappaport rightly and indeed, brilliantly highlights as 
essential to human social life and evolution. 
Against Rappaport, sports have always constituted a very important social ritual 
in all human societies alongside other more obviously cosmologically oriented rituals 
(Huizinga 1949: 5), though in fact the distinction between the two is not often 
discernible: ‘There is no distinction whatsoever between the marking out of a space for 
a sacred purpose and marking it out for the purposes of sheer play’ (Huizinga 1949: 20). 
Archaeologists have found traces of games in the earliest civilisations and 
anthropologists among the Kung bushmen of the Kalahari desert have recorded betting 
games in which male hunters will participate. Sports provide an important ritualistic 
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arena in which the members of any social groups can express their understandings and 
affirm and re-negotiate their social relations with each other. Since social relations are 
constituted by these understandings, sporting rituals like any other ritual do not have the 
subordinate and superfluous position in human life which is often imputed to them. In 
the sporting ritual, the social relations of particular social groups are re-affirmed and 
since these social relations have an economic aspect, the economic reality of a 
particular society is also re-constituted in the sporting ritual. Sporting rituals are 
indivisibly linked to economic practices embedded in social networks and they will 
necessarily re-affirm these practices. It is wrong to claim that the economic reality or 
the mode of production crudely determines the kinds of sporting rituals which occur. 
Sporting ritual reaffirm social relations which inevitably involve an economic 
dimension. The central role of the sporting ritual in the recreation of social groups can 
be demonstrated by examining two prominent historic examples, the Roman spectacle 
and contemporary European football.
Two Historical Examples
The Roman Spectacle
Like the Greek games, the gladiatorial combats of classical Rome originated as an 
element in a wider religious rite; they were initially associated with funerals where the 
combats – and the subsequent deaths – were intended to honour the deceased. The first 
recorded gladiatorial combat took place in 264BC in honour of an aristocrat’s dead 
father and involved only three pairs of gladiators (Hopkins 1983: 4). Over the next two 
centuries, the scale and frequency of gladiatorial shows steadily increased so that in 65 
BC Julius Caesar organised a combat of 320 pairs of gladiators in an elaborate funeral 
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rite for this father (Hopkins 1983 4). Developing from this funerary origin, the 
spectacles which occurred in the amphitheatres of most towns and cities throughout the 
empire eventually consisted of three defined events; the execution of criminals often by 
wild animals, wild animal hunts and, finally, the combats themselves.
For the patricians and later the emperors, the gladiatorial spectacles were an 
effective way of gaining the political good will of the population; indeed, in many 
towns the organisation of spectacles was a form of compulsory public donation by the 
rich. Aristocrats also employed the spectacles as a means of asserting their superiority 
over rival patricians since the scale of the spectacle denoted their status. Recognising 
the political significance of the spectacles in gaining popular support, the emperors 
gradually arrogated the right to hold these events. The first emperor, Augustus, 
restricted the number of spectacles which patricians could hold and as the emperor 
replaced the patricians as the primary sponsor of the spectacles, the spectacles became 
more elaborate taking on their mature form (Hopkins 1983: 6). For instance, in 80 AD, 
the emperor Titus organised a spectacle in which between 8 and 9,000 wild and exotic 
animals were killed in a single day (Hopkins 1983: 9). Eventually, emperors ruled that 
they alone could organise spectacles in Rome itself. The monopolisation of Roman 
spectacle by the emperor was an indexical demonstration of the eclipse of the patrician 
class and the transformation of an oligarchical republic into an absolutist state which 
the emperor and the army dominated. The populace now no longer demonstrated their 
allegiance to aristocratic sponsors but to the emperor alone. 
Through huge spectacles, involving exotic beasts imported from the furthest 
reachest of the empire, emperors demonstrated their absolute authority. ‘indexically’. In 
the course of the games, criminals were often thrown to exotic wild animals (Hopkins 
1983: 11), which would themselves be killed in subsequent hunting displays within the 
arena. This process ritualistically equated criminals with the status of mere beasts and 
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was as a powerful statement of social hierarchy. The Roman spectacle was a graphic 
demonstration of the social abjection of slaves and criminals (Auguet 1994:184; 
Hopkins 1983:12). Significantly, although the crowd might plead for the life of a 
gladiator who had fought well, the decision of life and death – as in the rest of Roman 
life – rested with the emperor alone. The spectacles were political events in which the 
power of the aristocrats and later the emperors were publicly demonstrated. In this way, 
the social hierarchy was affirmed. Yet, this hierarchy could also be called into question 
or even subverted for the spectacle provided a place where the populace could gather 
and vent its communal displeasure at the emperor (Hopkins 1983: 15,18). In AD 195, 
although Caligula silenced a protest by the crowd in the chariot circus against taxes by 
threats of instant execution, the malcontent of the crowd, tangible even after it had been 
reduced to silence by the threat of death, strengthened the conspirators’ resolve to 
assassinate the emperor (Hopkins 1983: 16).
Through the spectacles the social hierarchy was publicly re-created by the active 
participation of aristocrats or emperors and the people. Simultaneously, the shared 
understandings which underpinned social practices and social relations in Roman life 
were also publicly demonstrated. Although the spectacles seem gratuitous to the 
modern sensibilities, only a few contemporaries such as Seneca were concerned by 
them (Hopkins 1983: 3). The Roman Empire was created through sustained force of 
arms over six centuries and the success of the Roman army in this period relied on the 
sophisticated tactics but more particularly on the ruthless discipline imposed upon 
Roman soldiers. Deserters were executed without mercy (Hopkins 1983: 1) while units 
which were deemed to have performed poorly were ‘decimated’; every tenth soldier 
was selected from the ranks and beaten to death by his fellows. This martial culture 
based on extreme violence and self-discipline was communicated graphically through 
the spectacles. The gladiatorial combats not only valorized military prowess but 
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gladiators were trained to embody appropriate Roman attitudes towards death. 
Gladiators were not expected to flinch in the face of death but rather, if they received 
the verdict of death from the emperor or presiding official, they were trained to kneel 
manfully before their victor holding his thigh and offering their throats silently to the 
blade. In this way, gladiators embodied the essential masculine virtues of Roman 
citizenship; the willingness to sacrifice one’s own life for the Empire without question. 
Moreover, it familiarised the populace with violent death and combat even after the 
imposition of the Roman peace. The centrality of gladiatorial combats to Roman culture 
was evinced at Pompeii where graffiti recorded female affection for certain gladiators 
(Hopkins 1983: 21)and a baby’s bottle was found stamped with the figure of a gladiator. 
It has been presumed that the bottle denotes the parents’ hope that the stoically 
masculine virtues of the gladiator might be passed onto the child. 
Although gratuitous to modern sensibilities, the Roman spectacle was not 
supererogatory to Roman society. It was an essential part of this civilisation because the 
social hierarchy and the understandings which defined social relations and practices in 
Rome were realised in the arena. Roman society was re-created periodically in the 
fervid atmosphere of the arena. The Roman spectacle was a central ritual in later 
Roman civilisation whereby the social hierarchy from Emperor, to citizens and down to 
slaves, criminals and finally animals was re-affirmed in the arena. The Emperor 
demonstrated his absolute authority and the populace subjected themselves indexically 
to this authority – or questioned it – through their active participation in the spectacle. 
Moreover, Emperor, citizens and indeed the slaves and gladiators demonstrated a 
commitment to the Roman way of life and death. The games communicated 
fundamental social understandings and were an expression of the hierarchical social 
order. 
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Football in Europe Today
1500 years after the collapse of the Roman empire, a new spectacle began to spread 
across the continent over which the Romans had ruled for nearly 600 years, taking place 
in many of the cities in whose arenas gladiators had once fought. From the end of the 
nineteenth century, originating in England, association football spread rapidly across 
Europe and became not only a participant sport as its English public-school developers 
had originally intended but an important social event for the growing urban population 
of the time. Reflecting the appetite of the new urban population for spectator sport, 
almost all the major European football clubs were established in the early twentieth 
century; Real Madrid, 1902, Barcelona 1899, AC Milan 1899, Juventus 1987, Bayern 
Munich 1900 and Olympic Marseilles 1900. From their inception until 1955, these 
clubs played exclusively in national or regional leagues which in the course of the 
twentieth century became more and more professionalised. However, in 1955, a new 
European competition was developed in which the champions of each nation would 
play each other in an international competition which became known as the European 
Cup. Like the Roman games, the spectacle of European football has similarly affirmed 
the wider social reality in which it took place. It has constituted an arena in which 
certain important social relations and understandings have been indexically expressed. 
The contemporary ritual of European football reflects and affirms the wider social 
regime in the manner in which the spectacles of Rome illustrated the imperial hierarchy.
As various commentators have noted, the process European integration can be 
usefully periodised into three distinct phases. From the 1950s, with the setting up of the 
three original European Communities, ECSC, Euratom and the EEC, and the signing of 
the Treaty of Rome in 1957, European integration proceeded successfully but 
integration did not erode national sovereignties. Rather in this early period the 
sovereignty of the nation state was carefully preserved (see Milward 1992). The key 
10
moment was the Luxembourg compromise of 1966 which allowed any nation to exempt 
itself from European policies if it so wished. As Alan Milward has demonstrated the 
early years of European integration did not involve the surrender of state sovereignty in 
the manner which functionalist theorists like Haas envisaged. In the early years, nation 
states engaged in European integration only to safeguard national prosperity and, at any 
point, they could appeal to the principle of subsidiarity. They could refuse to accept 
European legislation. Significantly, although the common market developed in the first 
era, it was limited only to the reduction of tariff and aimed only at increasing cross-
border trade for consumer goods. This common market aimed at increasing the market 
for the various Keynesian-oriented national economies. However, by opening up the 
market for consumer goods but not labour and services, the national economic 
sovereignty of member states was not challenged. The corporatist relationship between 
labour, capital and the state was not threatened by putting domestic labour into direct 
international competition. In the 1970s, the progress of the early years of European 
integration faltered in the face of economic crisis and the incipient collapse of the 
Fordist consensus in each nation. European integration was re-invigorated again after 
1986 and particularly in the 1990s. Neo-liberal measures which aimed at the creation of 
genuinely pan-European markets were implemented vigorously by the Commission. 
The turn to neo-liberalism was exemplified most strongly by the so-called Project 1992 
aimed at European monetary integration and by subsequent treaties at Maastricht, 
Amsterdam and Nice. Durhing this period the Commission has vigorously promoted 
free market legislation which has tried to increase transnational competition within 
Europe in every economic sector. The fundamental idea behind this legislation is that 
for Europe to copmete in the global economy, it needs to develop bigger concentrations 
of capital. Such concentrations will emerge through transnational competition which 
will force large national players to merge with companies from other member states to 
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produce genuinely European multinationals. Although the Commission has drafted 
important legislation during the 1990s, Europe in this final era is not a supranational 
phenomenon, even though the market has become dominant and nation-states have 
retreated from economic management. Europe is still politically dominated by states 
who legislate intergovernmentally through the Council of Ministers. However, in 
contrast to the early period on which Milward focuses, the sovereignty of the nation 
states has declined in the face of the pressures of multinational capital and the policy of 
de-regulation is ultimately promoted by the member states themselves who are worried 
about Europe’s low-term competitiveness. In this neo-liberal Europe, regions and cities 
within each nation have become more autonomous in attracting inward investment. 
Consequently, Europe today is a complex reality which has been described as ‘neo-
medieval’ in that regional, national and supranational institutions now operate 
simultaneously, with overlapping and sometimes conflicting sovereignties. 
Just as in Rome, European football has reflected and embodied this wider social 
regime and can be periodised into three main periods. In the first from 1955 to 1970, 
European competition, like the wider Communities was successfully established but the 
new European competition did not threaten the national leagues. Although the clubs of 
different nations played each other, the national leagues were still secure with the 
authority of the national federations, supported by UEFA, the Union of European 
Football Associations, remaining unchallenged.1 Although the Spanish and Italian 
leagues were open to foreigners in the 1950s, from the early 1960s national leagues 
excluded or severely limited the number of foreigners who could play for domestic 
clubs. Excluding the Spanish teams of the 1950s, the teams which competed in Europe 
from 1955 until the 1980s were comprised of indigenous nationals. It was interesting 
that reflecting the national constitution of the teams, the press coverage viewed 
European football as vicarious international fixtures in which the clubs 
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unproblematically represented their nations. Thus, in 1968 when Manchester United 
played Portugal at Wembley in the European Cup final, the match was viewed as an 
international between England and Portugal, even though several of the United players 
were in fact Scottish or Irish. 
For this is a national occasion make no mistake. It is seen as revenge for 
Portugal’s World Cup defeat and Benfica’s humiliating 5-1 defeat by 
Manchester United…two years ago. (Green 29 May 1968:15)
Between 1955 and the early 1970s, European football was organised under an 
international regime in which the different national leagues were separate and 
sovereign. European competition was analogous to the developing Economic 
Community since it involved increasing cross-border trade in a particular good, football 
matches, but not in services or labour. The basis of production was still national but the 
market was expanded across national boundaries. From the early 1970s until the mid-
1980s, European competition was compromised by hooliganism, corruption and poor 
play, echoing the wider crisis in the post-War settlement. European football went 
through its own period of Eurosclerosis. From 1986, however, after the nadir of the 
Heysel stadium disaster in which 39 Juventus fans died in a riot with Liverpool fans, 
European football began to organise itself on a new basis, like the European Union. The 
international regime was gradually replaced as European football experienced de-
regulation which paralleled the wider project 1992. 
The de-regulation of European footbal involved two major developments. From 
the early 1980s, the state control of broadcasting which had been hegemonic across 
Europe in the post-war era began to collapse in the face of technological developments 
and increasing competition. Neo-liberal policies in each country undid this state 
broadcasting system and allowed for the development of new television companies 
often delivered through new cable and satellite technology. Many of the old state 
monopolies, the BBC, ARD (Germany), TF1 (France), RAI (Italy) and TVE (Spain) 
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remained (in the case of TFI in privatised form) but they operated in competition with 
new private and satellite companies. The viability of these new private companies was 
dependent on attaining programming of sufficient quality that viewers would be wiling 
to pay subscription fees for exclusive access to these channels. Sport and above all 
football was recognised as a prime form of content. ‘Sport absolutely overpowers film 
and everything else in the entertainment genre [and] football, of all sports, is number 
one’ (Rupert Murdoch cited in Guest and Law 1997:24). Sport and football in particular 
is, to use Murdoch’s term, a ‘battering ram’ by which new networks could break into 
and indeed create new markets for themselves (Harveson, Financial Times, 16 October 
1996). Consequently from the late 1980s but particularly in the early 1990s, satellite, 
private and state broadcasting companies competed ferociously for exclusive rights to 
domestic and European football, multiplying the revenue which football could earn 
from television. This dramatic increase in revenue was not distributed evenly, though. 
Rather, consistent with the new neo-liberal hegemony, the biggest football clubs across 
Europe were able to demand a greater share of this revenue. The big clubs attracted the 
large television audiences. The de-regulation of football precipitated a rapid 
concentration of financial and playing capital at the biggest clubs in Europe. This 
concentration was accelerated dramatically by a second piece of de-regulation.
From the 1960s, European football had been organised on an international basis. 
Each national league was sovereign and the player market was limited or restricted to 
indigenous players. From the 1970s, the biggest clubs sought to employ one or two 
foreign stars and the European Commission itself began to express concerns about the 
restrictiveness of UEFA’s regulations about foreign players. Gradually in the course of 
the 1980s under pressure from the Commission and the clubs, UEFA reduced the 
restrictions on foreign players until in 1992, three foreign players and two ‘assimilated’ 
players were allowed to play for a club team in a European competition. The 
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Commission were unsatisfied with this compromise and waited for a court case in 
which the legality of UEFA’s restrictions could be tested. That test case finally took 
place in 1995 when a Belgian footballer, Jean-Marie Bosman, took his club Standard 
Liege to the European Court of Justice to challenge the legality of Belgian transfer 
arrangements. Bosman’s transfer to Dunkerque had fallen threw and Standard Liege 
had exercised their right to retain his services on a third of his normal pay because the 
club had no intention of playing him. In addition, supported by the Commission and the 
European players union, FIFPro, he appended a challenge against the foreign player 
restrictions on the grounds that they were in breach of European laws on freedom of 
trade. In December 1995, the European Court of Justice ruled in favour of Bosman. Out 
of contract transfer fees were abolished but far more significantly foreign player 
restrictions were outlawed. The Bosman ruling abolished all restrictions on football 
players who were nationals of European member states. Although certainly questioned, 
the restrictions on players outside the European Union remained. In abolishing the 
restriction on member state players, the Bosman ruling created a pan-European market 
for professional footballers at a stroke This pan-European market brought the biggest 
European clubs together into ever closer relations with each other as they competed for 
the top players. Yet, while the biggest clubs were brought into ever closer competition 
with each other, funded by de-regulated television rights, they were able to exploit this 
new market situation to their advantage. They could hire star players from any part of 
the Union and since 1995, the biggest European clubs have been able to create 
unprecedented squads of international stars unfettered by national boundaries. In each 
country, two or three of the biggest club teams have been able to accumulate playing 
talent in a way which was impossible previously. The result is that these clubs have 
differentiated themselves from their former domestic rivals while forming an 
increasingly coherent transnational European elite. 
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The de-regulation of European footbal in the 1990s has transformed the 
geography of European football. European football no longer consists of a series of 
discrete national markets each with its won internal hierarchies from smallest to the 
biggest clubs. Instead, there is a single European market dominated by the biggest clubs 
at key points in a network which transcends national borders. A new transnational 
hierarchy has emerged in which the biggest clubs are predominant. The biggest clubs 
compete with each other for all the stars from within the European Union seriously 
disadvantaging smaller clubs in their own leagues and even big clubs in small markets 
such as Ajax of Amsterdam which are no longer protected from the transnational 
market. The biggest clubs can recruit from across the Union and but they are also 
developing transnational connections to expedite their operations in this European 
market. Manchester United has formal links with Royal Antwerp, Shelbourne FC in 
Ireland, FC Fortune in South Africa as well as two clubs in Sweden using these clubs to 
gather local talent for them and as nurseries for their young reserve team players. In 
1998 Arsenal arranged a five year agreement with St. Etienne in which the London club 
has invested 3.5 million francs in return for first choice of promising stars, whom St 
Etienne have had a good record in producing (Eastham 1999: 72). The major European 
clubs are in a process of developing vertically integrated transnational networks which 
allow these clubs to compete more effectively in the global market for players. 
Ironically, as these clubs become more European and indeed global in their 
orientation, they simultaneously emphasise their connection to their local city and 
region more strongly than was ever the case in during the era of the international 
regime. During that period these clubs recruited on a nation-wide basis, but in the light 
of the Bosman ruling the increased competition for top players the major clubs across 
Europe have improved their training programmes in order to monopolise and develop 
local talent. 
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I think what Bosman forced you to do was to widen the net and spend a awful 
lot more on trying to get talent younger and develop it. (Peter Kenyon, chief 
executive Manchester United Plc, personal interview 3 March 2000)2
Other big clubs are developing similar schemes but also recognise the difficulty of 
producing in-house talent.
It is very difficult for a big club to produce talent. Man Utd are based on certain 
talent they found in house, with the Neville brothers, Beckham, Scholes and 
Giggs and so on. We are still based on Maldini, and Albertini and Costacurta, 
we raised ten, fifteen years ago. We don’t have anybody in between. It is not so 
easy…I think it is very difficult to develop young talent within your own 
system. (Umberto Gandini, AC Milan, personal interview 15 March 2000)
A dual process is in place where there is a concentration around certain key sites in 
European football from which points of concentration, new transnational networks 
extend. Significantly, the new geography of European football parallels wider 
developments in the post-Fordist, globalised era in which the forces of multinational 
capital have increasingly subverted the former unity of Keynesian national economies. 
The developments in European football match the wider processes of uneven regional 
development and the incipient fragmentation of formerly unified nations. Certainly as 
in the wider process, the nation constitutes an important institutional fact. National 
leagues and national federations are still strong and support for national teams remains 
fervent. However, the clubs are rapidly relatively more powerful in relation to national 
federations and to UEFA than in the previous era. In addition, the national leagues and 
nationalism itself are being re-formulated in the face of this growing importance of the 
biggest clubs. In football, as in European more widely, we are entering a de-regulated 
era in which a new transnational, neo-medieval order is emerging. European football 
today reflects the wider economic regime in which we now live. However, this 
economic regime does not determine the ritual form simplisticly. Rather the new 
economic regime is the product of transforming social relations and the dominance of 
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new social groups and institutions which are engaged in particular kinds of economic 
activity. The ritual recreates these social relations and institutions and therefore the 
economic practices and relations which are part of them.
As we have seen with the Roman spectacle, the ritual does not merely affirm 
social relations between groups but it also communicates the understandings which 
constitute these social relations. In particular, in sporting rituals, cultural understandings 
of identity and agency are realised; in the arena, the gladiators embodied the stoic 
masculine virtues of the Roman citizen who would face violent death unflinchingly. 
European football similarly communicates concepts of masculinity; through their style 
of play, players become dense symbols which communicate to the spectators ideal 
forms of masculinity. Contemporary ideals of masculinity differ markedly from those 
embodied by the gladiators in the arena, though. Western European societies have 
undergone profound transformation in the last 30 years, moving from a Keynesian and 
Fordist regime to a neo-liberal and post-Fordist one. One of the central features of this 
new regime is de-regulation involving the retreat of the state from economic 
intervention. In place of the state, multinational corporations have become increasingly 
dominant and, as they have, new professional groups have emerged and become 
hegemonic. In the post-war era, the professional groups working in state bureaucracy, 
the so-called ‘state-nobility’ as Bourdieu calls them (Bourdieu 1996), were an 
extremely important if not dominant group in each European country. With the erosion 
of the state, this professional group has been increasingly superseded by a private-sector 
professional group employed in multinational corporations and thrown to the fore by 
free market forces. In Distinction (1984), Bourdieu has described the rise of this private 
sector group, referring to it as the ‘right-bank’ middle class. For him this group has high 
economic but low cultural capital as opposed to the intellectual and public sector elite 
which he terms the ‘left-bank’. Other sociologists such as Goldthorpe (1980), 
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Abercrombie and Urry (1983) and Savage et al. (1992) have also noted the rise of this 
professional group referring to it as the ‘service’ class. As Bourdieu et al. note this 
group has developed a new form of status lifestyle sometimes called ‘postmodern’ 
(Savage et al. 1992: 109) which has become extremely prominent in contemporary 
society. In her study of the culture of professional groups in financial service industries 
in the City of London, Mcdowell has illuminated the new lifestyles of this group, 
highlightings its emphasis on ecstatic and expensive practices at work and at leisure; 
she notes the trading floor was ‘carnivalesque’, ‘transgressing bourgeois norms of 
work’(Mcdowell 1997: 167) and that this group of professionals prioritised bodily 
appearance which communicated a concern with sophisticated consumption. This 
professional group indulges in an extravagant, hedonistic life of consumption, funded 
by the large salaries from the private employment in large corporations. In this way, the 
group represents and promotes the free market but, while opposing state control and 
engaging in extravagant consumption, this group do not represent social disorder. On 
the contrary, the forms of consumption in which they indulge are increasingly focused 
on the family. For this group and for wider society, the private family has become the 
key site of activities and of social control. Men are expected to engage in ecstatic forms 
of consumption rather than demonstrate rational self-discipline. However, men’s role as 
fathers and husbands has been emphasised because the family unit has become so 
important. The ideal man is totally incorporated into his family not as a stern 
authoritarian but as a loving partner and father. It is significantly that as Margaret 
Thatcher who was key figure in promoting the post-Fordist transformation of Britain 
and a strong supporter of this entrepreneurial group against the ‘establishment’ also 
emphasised the significance of the family. For Thatcher, famously, ‘there was no such 
thing as society, only individuals and families’ (Morgan 1990: 440). In post-Fordist 
society, the family has become an increasingly important social unit which engaged 
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together in new forms of consumption. The family has become useful as a unit of 
consumption because it provided a lucrative market but was more disciplined in its 
consumption. Unlike other groupings such as young men,  families remained passive as 
they indulged in potentially ecstatic forms of consumption.
This new familial masculinity of dominant private-sector professional groups is 
demonstrated in the contemporary ritual of football. Before the 1960s, professional 
football players in Britain were almost equivalent to the working class groups from 
which they generally emerged.  Certainly, professional players enjoyed greater status 
than other workers and earned a slightly larger wage than most of the working class but 
these benefits were temporary and relatively small. With the abolition of the maximum 
wage in Britain in 1961, the salaries of professional football increased dramatically. 
Professional footballers were rapidly detached from working class groups and became a 
prominent part of emergent private sector professional groups connected closely with 
entertainment and media elites. From the 1960s, professional football players across 
Europe have become part of that status group which described as the ‘right-bank’ elite 
or service class. This process has accelerated and become more pronounced from the 
1980s as players salaries have increased dramatically as a result of the growth in 
television revenue. Football players in Europe today represent a professional group 
promoted by neo-liberal legislation and the de-regulation of global capital. The star 
players are extremely wealthy and follow the ‘postmodern’ lifestyle of the hegemonic 
service class. At the same time as having become members of this important status 
group, linked closely to multinational corporations, in the 1990s professional football 
have become representatives of familial masculinity. 
Players are now closely associated with children at critical moments in 
European football. Before most games, players will escort a child mascot onto the pitch. 
Indeed in Champions League finals3, two teams of child mascots dressed in the strip of 
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the finalists accompany a player from the opposing team out of the tunnel onto the pitch 
and line up in front of the players until the opening ceremonies are complete. It is 
important to recognise that the inclusion of children in the opening ceremonies of 
Champions League matches is a completely new departure in the 1990s and before the 
development of the Champions Leagues, the teams walked out alone and the formerly 
brief opening ceremonies involved the two teams alone. In addition, before Champions 
League games, as the players line up, children wave a circular starred banner (the 
symbol of the Champions League) over the centre-circle as the anthem of the 
competition is played. By linking the male football stars to children, UEFA, who have 
choreographed these opening sequences carefully, highlights a familial masculinity. 
This familial masculinity has been demonstrated spontaneously elsewhere. At the 
conclusion of the 1999-2000 season, Manchester United players brought their children 
onto the pitch when they received the trophy, while Chelsea’s captain, Dennis Wise, 
carried his six-month old son up the steps at Wembley to receive the FA Cup in the 
same year. Since that time, this phenomenon has become the norm; it is now expected 
that players should celebrate their victories with their children. In line with this, the 
Arsenal double-winning team of 2002 also celebrated their victory with their children. 
Their status as fathers has become increasingly important to their celebrity and their 
fatherly celebrations reflect the presence of similarly celebrating families in the stands.
David Beckham, the Manchester United midfielder and England captain, has 
become the most obvious symbol of this new masculinity. David Beckham is certainly 
exceptional because of his extraordinary celebrity partly due to his marriage to Victoria 
Adams, one of the members of the popular group, The Spice Girls. Yet, his 
extraordinary celebrity does not invalidate using him as an example of a wider 
development. On the contrary, Beckham has become a global figure because he 
embodies the ideals of the new familial masculinity of the private-sector elite so well. 
21
He is handsome, talented, successful and, as a result of his professional employment, 
extremely wealthy. Beckham is a disciplined professional who is dedicated to his sport 
while, in his private life, he has become a powerful symbol of contemporary 
fatherhood. He has been represented exclusively as a loyal husband and caring father.4 
In interesting contrast to the usual reasons for absenteeism (alcohol and womanizing) 
among British professional footballers, Beckham’s only significant breach with his club 
came when he missed a training session because he was tending to his sick son. 
Significantly, in describing his close relationship with his wife and child, Beckham 
declared, “I’m not scared of my feminine side and I think quite a lot of the things I do 
come from that side of my character”(Lemos 2002).5 Although only a colloquial phrase, 
the concept of having a feminine side is an interesting one. In their discussion of the 
forms of masculinity which became hegemonic in nineteenth and twentieth century 
Europe, Mosse (1985) and Theweleit (1987) have illustrated how this masculinity 
opposed itself rigorously to femininity. Masculinity was normal and respectable insofar 
as it separated itself from and suppressed the feminine. In his well-known study of the 
Freikorps in Weimar Germany, Theweleit reveals how members of this militia 
conceived of femininity as a flood which threatened to ingulf them and which could 
only be resisted through strict self-discipline (Theweleit 1987). Beckham’s public 
statement that his masculinity includes a feminine element is an explicit subversion of 
this modern definition of masculinity. His masculinity involves the acceptance and 
indeed indulgence of the emotional and feminine. It is notable that an early controversy 
involved having his picture taken wearing a sarong which demonstrated sartorially 
Beckham’s feminised masculinity and more recently he had been pictured wearing nail 
varnish (Lemos 2002). Significantly, he has also become an icon for gays and he 
himself has happily embraced his position in the gay subculture even though he himself 
is not homosexual. The masculinity which Beckham represents is a decisive 
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transformation from modern respectability. He is a symbol of the masculinity of a new 
professional status group who prioritise an extravagant but familial lifestyle. Through 
the ritual of sport, certain players become sacred totems which symbolise the central 
values of the groups engaging in that ritual. David Beckham has become a 
representative of a dominant status group in post-Fordist society which has created a 
distinctive familial masculinity for itself.
Conclusion
At the end of The Elementary Forms, Durkheim wistfully remarks: ‘A day will come 
when our society will know again those hours of creative effervescence’ (Durkheim 
1976: 427-8). Durkheim believes that these vital moments of creative effervescence will 
appear among the professional groups which he promotes as the only possible solution 
to insidious anomie. The professional group is an important source of social solidarity 
in modern societies but Durkheim completely ignored a key public ritual which could 
also produce ‘hours of creative effervescence’: sport. It is possible that he ignored the 
significance of sport as a modern ritual because of the relative under-urbanisation of 
France. The mass urban spectator sports such as football developed slowly and weakly 
in France in comparison with other European countries. Like the tribal rituals of 
aboriginal peoples, in the modern sporting ritual some of the most important social 
groups of which Europeans are part are re-constituted through their ecstatic 
participation in sport. Consequently, the sporting ritual provides an illuminating focus 
for sociological research because it is an arena in which social relations and shared 
understandings are viscerally re-created. These recreations are not supererogatory to the 
social order which would exist without them. Because social relations have meaningful 
dimension, they have to be recognised by those who are party to them and the ritual 
constitutes the critical site at which this communal recognition takes place. On winter 
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nights European cities are studded with domes of light in which a new spectacle takes 
place that realises the contemporary social order of the New Europe as powerfully as 
the gladiatorial combats demonstrated the political structure of the Roman Empire. The 
problem is that so familiar has the extraordinary spectacle of European football become 
that it is easy to forget its social significance and to relegate it to a mere 
epiphenomenon. It is a strange that what appears as merely otiose to the desiccated 
analysis of the sociologists should be the most compelling event in the lives of millions 
of Europeans. Yet, as long as sport is regarded as a merely form of leisure or an 
unnecessary act of consumption, sociology will continue to underestimate one of the 
most interesting and, indeed, most illuminating social institutions in European society 
today.
Footnotes
1 UEFA was established in 1954. Since that time it has provided a forum for European 
football associations and organised European competitions.
2 The quotations are taken from interviews carried out as part of an ESRC-funded 
research-project ‘Football and Post-National Identity in the New Europe’. See King 
2003 for the monograph based on that research.
3 The Champions League replaced the European Cup in 1992.
4 The distinctiveness of this familial masculinity contrasts with the kinds of ways which 
some masculine fans in Europe find it appropriate to support of their team. They oppose 
Beckham’s familial masculinity and promote a masculinity which prioritises 
objectivising sex with women and, sometimes, violence against other fans.
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5 The popular music and style magazine, The Face, calls him ‘the biggest woman in the 
entire history of sport.’
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